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While prior literature has identified various effects of environmental policy, this note uses the 
example of a proposed carbon permit system to illustrate and discuss six different types of 
distributional effects: (1) higher prices of carbon-intensive products, (2) changes in relative 
returns to factors like labor, capital, and resources, (3) allocation of scarcity rents from a 
restricted number of permits, (4) distribution of the benefits from improvements in 
environmental quality, (5) temporary effects during the transition, and (6) capitalization of all 
those effects into prices of land, corporate stock, or house values.  The note also discusses 
whether all six effects could be regressive, that is, whether carbon policy could place 
disproportionate burden on the poor. 
JEL-Code: H23, Q52. 













 Existing literature in environmental economics emphasizes efficiency effects of 
pollution controls.  It shows how to measure the costs of reducing pollution or energy use 
and how to measure the benefits.  Overall benefits are balanced against overall costs to 
determine the optimal amount of abatement and to determine the most cost-effective way 
to achieve it.  Fewer studies address the question of who bears those costs or receives 
those benefits, even though any individual’s net gain or loss as a fraction of income may 
greatly exceed the economy-wide gain or loss as a fraction of income. 
A huge literature in public economics studies the distributional effects of taxes, 
but for several reasons, the study of the distributional effects of environmental policy can 
be much more difficult and interesting.  First of all, most pollution policies are not taxes 
at all, but instead employ permits or command and control (CAC) regulations such as 
technology standards, quotas, and other quantity constraints.  Second, the effects of 
environmental policy are much more varied, intricate, and indirect.  Standard methods of 
tax incidence find effects on product prices and on returns to labor and capital, but energy 
or environmental policy can have six separately identifiable effects.  Very different kinds 
of models and data are necessary to analyze each of these effects, and so no single study 
could possibly incorporate all such effects simultaneously.    
These six effects are identified in the literature reviewed by Fullerton (2009), but 
that literature touches on many different policies and methods of estimation.
1  This short 
note cannot review all that literature.  Instead, for coherency, it illustrates all six effects 
using a single comprehensive example, namely, a carbon permit system such the cap-and-
trade legislation that passed the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009 (which then 
stalled in the Senate).  No other paper discusses all effects in the context of one policy, so 
the contribution of this note is to illustrate how one climate policy can have all six effects 
simultaneously.  For any given person, the six effects may augment or offset each other.  
In this particular case, many or all effects may all be regressive (net burden as a fraction 
of income that is higher for the poor than for the rich).
2
                                                 
1 The tax incidence literature is reviewed by Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).  Some of the distributional 
effects of environmental policy are discussed in a chapter of the classic text by Baumol and Oates (1988).  
Another recent review of literature on these distributional effects is in Parry, et al (2006). 
  An implication is that a reform 
package can include features to offset losses to low-income families. 
2 A policy is regressive if the burden to income ratio is lower for those with more income. It is proportional 
if burden/income is the same for all groups, and it is progressive if that ratio is higher for those with more 
income.  Even if the amount spent on electricity rises with income, the fraction of income spent on that 
good falls with income.  Thus, any increase in the price of electricity is likely regressive.      -2- 
The rest of this section summarizes the six effects of climate policy and how each 
might be regressive.  The following six sections discuss each effect in more detail. 
First, a carbon permit policy is likely to raise the price of products that intensively 
use fossil fuels, such as electricity, heating fuel, and gasoline.  Low-income families use a 
relatively high fraction of their income to buy these goods, so they have high burdens on 
the “uses side” of income.  Second, if abatement technologies are capital-intensive, then 
any mandate to abate pollution likely induces firms to use new capital as a substitute for 
polluting inputs.  If so, then capital demand rises relative to labor, depressing the relative 
wage.  Low-income families receive a relatively high fraction of income from wages, so 
they may have high burdens on the “sources side” of income.  Third, pollution permits 
handed out to firms bestow scarcity rents on well-off individuals who own those firms. 
Fourth, climate policy provides benefits if it helps improve local air quality, 
reduce global warming, and avoid sea-level rise.  Low-income individuals may place 
more value on food and shelter than on incremental improvements in air quality, while 
high-income households may own the ocean-front property saved by climate policy.  If 
so, then this effect is regressive as well.  Fifth, the transition to cap-and-trade will impact 
households differentially.  Unemployment may be experienced by loggers and coal 
miners, while premiums go to skilled workers in renewables and other energy-efficient 
technologies.  Sixth, each of those five effects might be capitalized into the price of an 
asset such as a house or corporate stock.  If so, then the owner gets not just those effects 
on income flows, but the present value of expected future flows.  Capitalization effects 
shift around the burden.  If climate policy will reduce sea level rise and save certain 
oceanfront homes, for example, then the benefit may be experienced not by the person 
who buys the house later and enjoys the oceanfront, but by the person who owns the 
house at the time of enactment.  If climate policy also raises ambient air quality, benefits 
might not accrue to low-income renters who have to pay higher rents, but to well-off 
landlords who own the house.  Climate policy may also raise the market value of high-
tech energy stocks and reduce those of traditional fossil fuel companies. 
These effects are best analyzed in a general equilibrium model that accounts for 
all markets simultaneously, including changes in production that affect the relative price 
of each input, each output, and each asset.  A comprehensive model of this type is called 
a computational general equilibrium (CGE) model or an integrated assessment model   -3- 
(IAM).
3
Figure 1: Categories of Gains and Losses 
  For expositional purposes, however, all six effects can be explained in a partial 
equilibrium diagram of a single market (as in Fullerton, 2009).  In the case of climate 
policy, firms could reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per unit of output (e.g., per 
kwh of electricity).  The simplest way to show all effects in one diagram, however, is 
temporarily to assume fixed emissions per unit.  Then the supply and demand for carbon 
is essentially the same as the supply and demand for the output. 
 
In Figure 1, using this example, the demand curve reflects the private marginal 
benefit (PMB) of electricity.  The supply curve reflects private marginal cost (PMC).  Yet 
production causes an externality, because the cost of pollution is borne by others, not by 
the firm.  Then the total cost of each unit is the social marginal cost (SMC), including 
both private marginal cost (PMC) and marginal external cost (MEC).  In this diagram, the 
unfettered private market produces to the point where PMB=PMC, namely output Q
o.  
The optimal output is where SMB=SMC, at reduced output Q'.  An ideal policy would 
somehow restrict output to Q'.  In the simple case with fixed emissions per unit output, a 
set number of CO2 permits could restrict sales to Q'.  In effect, supply is vertical at Q', so 
the new intersection of supply and demand is at equilibrium gross price P
g.  After firms 
pay for permits, the new net price is P
n.  The price of a permit is the difference (P
g – P
n).  
If the industry is competitive, then pure profits are zero: net sales revenue is just enough 
to pay for all other inputs to production, such as labor, capital, fuel, and materials. 
                                                 
3 Examples of such models are described in Nordhaus (2008), Elliott et al (2010), and Rauch et al (2010).   -4- 
1. COSTS TO CONSUMERS 
  Since the cap-and-trade policy raises the consumer’s price of electricity to P
g, it 
reduces consumer surplus by the trapezoid area A+D.  The amount of this price increase 
and the resulting burden depend on various considerations that need to be analyzed.  It is 
relatively large, as drawn, because the negative elasticity of demand (η
D) has smaller 
absolute value than the elasticity of supply (η
S).
4  Thus economic analysis in each case 
needs both a demand and supply elasticity, and data on the fraction of each group's 
income spent on the good.  For example, climate policy would raise the price of gasoline, 
for which West and Williams (2004) estimate a set of demand parameters. They calculate 
four different measures of consumer surplus (area A+D) for each income group, and they 
find that the increase in gasoline price is regressive.
5
The effects of climate policy on multiple output prices are calculated in CGE 
models by Elliott et al (2010) and by Rausch et al (2010), but a simpler analytical general 
equilibrium model of Fullerton and Heutel (2010) aggregates carbon-intensive goods and 
finds that an increase in the CO2 price from $15/ton to $30/ton would raise that output 
price by 7.2%.  They then use data on spending and incomes of thousands of households 
in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to find that the ratio of burden to income 
rises monotonically across annual income deciles.  The first eight deciles lose more than 
average, while the highest two income deciles lose less than average. 
  In some analyses it is not strictly 
regressive, because the very poorest households cannot afford a car (Poterba, 1991). 
  In analyzing distributional effects, a major issue is how to define who is rich or 
poor.  A problem is that the lowest annual income group includes some whose income is 
temporarily low and others who are stuck at that level. An alternative is to classify house-
holds by their total annual consumption expenditures, because it is a proxy for permanent 
income (assuming people smooth their consumption by spending less than their annual 
income in good years and more in bad years). When households in the CEX are classified 
by annual consumption, climate policy is less regressive.   
                                                 
4 The permit price (P
g – P
n) is analogous to a tax wedge.  Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) show that the 
fraction of a tax borne by consumers is η
S/(η
S – η
D). This fraction is higher with a larger η
S or smaller η
D.  
5 One measure assumes no price responses, one assumes all groups have the same price response, ones uses 
each group's own price response, and the fourth is the equivalent variation for each group.  The higher gas 
price is most regressive with no return of revenue, less regressive when revenue is used to cut wage taxes, 
and becomes progressive when revenue is used to provide the same lump-sum rebate to each household.    -5- 
Finally, of course, distributional effects could be measured not just across income 
groups, but across regions, age groups, or demographic characteristics.  Climate policy 
would disproportionately burden Southern states in the U.S., where people spend more 
than average on electricity to run their air conditioners.  And, of course, higher fuel and 
electricity costs would hurt current generations more than future generations who would 
benefit from technological progress that reduces the cost of renewable fuels and energy-
efficient appliances.  Distributional effects also could be measured across countries.  For 
the same carbon price, nations that rely disproportionately on coal would face higher 
electricity prices than those who use less-carbon-intensive fuel like natural gas.  Denmark 
uses a lot of wind power, while Sweden uses hydroelectric power. 
2. COSTS TO PRODUCERS OR FACTORS 
  Energy or environmental policy may also impose burdens on producers or factors 
of production.  In Figure 1, the loss in producer surplus is area B+E. This area is small, as 
drawn, because the supply curve (PMC) is relatively elastic.  These losses are larger if 
instead production involves industry-specific resources in relatively fixed supply, such as 
a specific type of energy, land with specific characteristics, or labor with particular skills.  
If so, then the cut-back in production burdens the owners of those limited resources. 
  Again, CGE models like those of Elliott et al (2010) or Rausch et al (2010) can be 
used to compute a new economy-wide wage, rate of return, or land rent.  Sophisticated 
dynamic general equilibrium models could be used to solve for short run effects, capital 
deepening, and the transition to a new balanced growth path with a new labor/capital 
ratio.  The analytical general equilibrium model of Fullerton and Heutel (2010) is not a 
growth model, since labor and capital are both in fixed supply, but it can show intuitively 
the effect of a carbon tax on multiple output prices and factor prices – including the wage 
for labor and the return to capital.  The “clean” sector uses only labor and capital, but the 
“dirty” sector uses labor, capital, and pollution.  With three inputs, any two can be 
complements or substitutes.  The “substitution effect” places less burden on whichever 
factor is a better substitute for pollution (and more burden on the other one).  Because the 
carbon policy raises output price and reduces production, the “output effect” is likely to 
place more burden on whichever factor is intensively used in the dirty sector.
6
                                                 
6 In this model, environmental quality is separable in utility.  In a more complicated model, the increase in 
environmental quality itself could affect the relative demands for goods and thus returns to factors.  
  Rausch et 
al (2010) also consider other sources of income such as from natural resources and from   -6- 
existing U.S. transfer programs.  Government transfers are often indexed to inflation, so 
an increase in energy prices leads to automatic cost-of-living adjustments.  This aspect of 
existing policy makes carbon pricing less regressive or even progressive. 
3. BENEFITS OF SCARCITY RENTS 
Any restriction on the quantity of the polluting good in Figure 1 makes the good 
scarce and gives rise to scarcity rents (area A+B).  If the policy is a carbon tax or auction 
of permits, then government captures the scarcity rents as revenue.  If it is a handout of 
permits or a simple quota, then area A+B becomes profits to the firms that are allowed to 
produce and sell the restricted quantity.  Normally firms want to restrict output but are 
prevented by antitrust policy.  Yet here, climate policy requires firms to restrict output.  It 
allows firms to raise price, and so they make profits.  That simple theory may be obvious 
in the case of Figure 1, where pollution is a fixed ratio to output, because a restriction on 
pollution also restricts output.  But what if firms can abate pollution per unit of output? 
Policy can still generate profits when firms can vary pollution itself, as shown by 
Maloney and McCormick (1982).  They provide evidence for two different regulations, 
using data on stock market returns around the imposition of each regulation.  First, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration imposed new cotton-dust technology 
standards uniformly on all textile firms in 1974.  They look at a portfolio of 14 textile 
stocks, and they find a significantly positive abnormal return when this rule is imposed.  
Also, in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of environmental groups that sued 
the EPA to “prevent significant deterioration” of air quality in areas already complying 
with national standards.  The new stricter standard only affected new entrants such as 
nonferrous ore smelting plants that emit sulfur oxides and particulates, so the authors 
consider stock prices of existing copper, lead, and zinc smelters.  Significant positive 
abnormal returns were found for existing firms in those industries. 
One might normally think that firms would oppose costly new environmental 
regulations, but Maloney and McCormick show that “the interests of environmentalists 
and producers may coincide against the welfare of consumers” (pp. 99-100).  This point 
is key both for the politics of environmental legislation and for distributional effects. 
In the case of climate policy, high abatement costs must be borne by somebody in 
society, but Parry (2004) shows how grandfathered permits generate profits that accrue to 
shareholders.  Thus, this policy can benefit high-income groups while imposing costs on   -7- 
others.  His analytical model has explicit formulas that show the impacts of underlying 
parameters, but the profits in his model are essentially area A+B.  Figure 1 also shows 
how consumers pay a higher price for goods like electricity.  For this reason, the House 
Bill would dedicate some permit value to reducing electric bills.      
4. BENEFITS OF PROTECTION 
  The gain from environmental protection in Figure 1 is area C+D+E, the sum of 
“marginal external costs” over the range that emissions are reduced (from Q
o to Q').  
What groups receive these benefits?  Those who benefit from climate policy are exactly 
those who would otherwise bear the costs of global warming, including lost biodiversity, 
sea level rise, and extreme weather events like droughts, floods, and hurricanes.  Cap-
and-trade may thus provide benefits to those who enjoy wildlife, but also to drug 
companies that use biodiversity to develop new medications.  It would benefit those who 
own coastal property.  This carbon policy might also reduce emissions of local pollutants, 
and thus reduce morbidity and mortality.
7
Many of the effects are regional.  Global warming might help those in cold areas, 
while imposing more costs on those in warm climates, dry climates, and low-lying areas 
subject to hurricanes or floods.  For just one example, Daniel et al (2009) summarize 117 
estimates from 19 U.S. hedonic house price studies of the effect of flood risk on house 
values, controlling for other differences in house and neighborhood characteristics.
  No study provides a comprehensive measure 
of these distributional effects by income group.   
8
Climate policy would reduce burning of fossil fuel and thus affect local pollutants 
and health, but it may also affect deaths from extreme hot or cold.  Deschênes and 
Greenstone (2007) use annual temperature variation in two climate models to find that 
climate change will increase U.S. mortality by a small amount that is not statistically 
  
They conduct a “meta-analysis” to summarize those studies, finding that a 0.01 increase 
in the probability of flood each year reduces house value by 0.6%, all else equal.  Owners 
in low-lying areas benefit if climate policy prevents increases in flood probabilities. 
                                                 
7 The U.S. EPA (1999) finds that most benefits of the Clean Air Act are mortality reductions.  Older or less 
healthy individuals have higher baseline mortality risk, and thus might benefit more from a reduction in the 
risk of dying this year.  If so, climate policy benefits the elderly and infirm.  On the other hand, they may 
have fewer years to live and be willing to pay less for a reduction in the risk of dying this year. 
8 With data on many house sales, the price can be estimated as a hedonic function of house characteristics 
and neighborhood characteristics such as air quality, water quality, or distance from a toxic waste site.  The 
coefficient on such a variable indicates the market's willingness to pay for environmental improvement.     -8- 
significant, but it would raise infant mortality more significantly.  To offset some of those 
effects, people will increase residential air conditioning and thus energy use by 15-30%, 
and they may move location to avoid hotter temperatures.  Thus, climate policy may 
reduce all these costs on those who now live in hotter climates. 
These studies are mere examples of possible effects on different U.S. groups from 
climate change.  A GHG policy would mitigate these effects within the U.S. as well as 
other distributional effects between countries.  Mendelsohn et al (2006) use predicted 
climate changes across the globe to calculate each country’s gain or loss.  Currently, 
agricultural productivity is highest in temperate regions, and so countries in hot climates 
tend to be poor already.  Thus, even the same increase in temperature would reduce 
productivity in poor countries more than in rich countries.  In this sense, climate policy to 
reduce global warming may provide the most benefit to the poorest countries.  
5. COSTS OF TRANSITION 
  Other distributional effects of climate policy include the costs of adjustment and 
transition.  These costs may be large, even if temporary.  In Figure 1, area E+F is the 
value of capital and labor leaving the industry.  With perfect mobility, they immediately 
earn the same return elsewhere.  With imperfect mobility, however, a policy shift can 
make existing plants obsolete and impose capital adjustment costs.  It can disrupt labor 
markets as well, and impose costs of retraining, relocation, and possibly long spells of 
unemployment between jobs.   
Few have studied labor adjustment costs, especially from climate policy.  In one 
exception, Deschênes (2010) looks at the effect of energy costs on labor demand.  He 
finds a negative cross-price elasticity.  Since the cap-and-trade bill that passed the U.S. 
House of Representatives in 2009 would raise electricity prices by about 4%, his 
preferred estimate suggests that U.S. employment would fall by 460,000 (about 0.6%). 
That estimate captures the effects on industries that react to their own higher 
electricity costs by reducing employment.  It does not capture other effects.  Climate 
policy does not operate through electricity prices, for example, if it reduces employment 
in mining or logging.  These occupations constitute major sources of income for entire 
towns in some areas.  Those workers may have acquired industry-specific human capital, 
and they lose that investment when the industry shrinks.  At the same time, the new   -9- 
policy may increase employment in abatement technology, renewable fuel production, 
and reforestation.  In other words, some lose from climate policy and others gain. 
6. EFFECTS ON ASSET PRICES 
   Those five types of gains or losses are measured annually, in Figure 1, but they 
also can be capitalized into asset prices.  For example, a corporate stock price might rise 
immediately from the expected future annual flow of scarcity rents (area A+B).  Also, the 
current price of agricultural land can rise to reflect future benefits from reduced global 
warming, and the price of oceanfront property can reflect benefits of reduced sea level 
rise (areas C+D+E).  If a policy to reduce carbon dioxide also reduces other emissions, 
then it likely provides different air quality improvements to different neighborhoods.  If 
so, then the present value of those gains can be captured by certain homeowners at the 
time of the change.
9
  Sieg, et al (2004) use data from 1989-91 in Southern California to estimate 
parameters of a structural model, and they use those estimates to calculate the welfare 
effects of air quality improvements from 1990 to 1995 (when ozone levels in different 
neighborhoods fell from 3% to 33%).  Areas with the most improvement might see 
upward pressure on house prices, but then some households sell at a gain and move to 
other cheaper neighborhoods.  These shifts induce further house price changes, until all 
prices achieve a new general equilibrium.  In one location where ozone fell by 24% in 
their study, they found that house prices rise nearly 11%.  Moreover, landlords reap gains 
while renters may lose.  Areas with the most environmental improvement may see the 
most increase in rents, which forces out low-income renters. 
  The homeowner may then sell the house at a premium to someone 
else.  If so, then the person who breathes the cleaner air is not the person who benefits 
from the environmental improvement.  When assets change hands, capitalization effects 
make it particularly difficult to measure the distributional effects of climate policy. 
Climate policy may cause major cutbacks in particular industries such as logging, 
mining, and coal-fired electricity generation.  Corporate stock prices may fall by a large 
amount, but those losses in certain industries are not necessarily a major problem to any 
one person if investors diversify their portfolios.  But workers may devote years of 
                                                 
9 The asset price increase exactly equals the present value of future benefits only if markets clear with 
perfect information and no transaction costs.  With major moving costs, however, the allocation of houses 
to owners may not perfectly reflect their willingness to pay.  Also, the capitalization is moderated by any 
elasticity in the supply of land.  The price may rise less if fringe land can be converted to residential use.   -10- 
training and learning on the job in such an industry, and then become unable to find any 
work in that industry after cut-backs.  If so, the burden is not just the lost wage in a given 
year, but the entire present discounted value of lost wages in all future years.  This human 
capital investment is not diversifiable, and so it can impose a much larger percentage loss 
for certain individuals than other asset price capitalization effects of climate policy.   
7. CONCLUSION      
Prior literature emphasizes the economic efficiency effects of environmental 
policy, but economists are now beginning to study distributional effects that can be much 
more difficult and challenging.  This paper illustrates the many types of distributional 
effects that can arise from just one new climate policy, and it thereby makes clear why no 
single study could possibly incorporate all of them. Initial studies have looked at output 
price and factor price changes, and generally find the impact to be regressive.  If the 
permits are sold at auction, then revenue is available to rebate to low-income households 
and offset those regressive effects.  But only careful analysis of all six effects can ensure 
improvements in environmental protection without adverse distributional consequences. 
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